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Predictions Shape Confidence in Right Inferior Frontal
Gyrus
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It is clear that prior expectations shape perceptual decision-making, yet their contribution to the construction of subjective
decision confidence remains largely unexplored. We recorded fMRI data while participants made perceptual decisions and con-
fidence judgments, manipulating perceptual prior expectations while controlling for potential confounds of attention. Results
show that subjective confidence increases as expectations increasingly support the decision, and that this relationship is associ-
ated with BOLD activity in right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Specifically, rIFG is sensitive to the discrepancy between expectation
and decision (mismatch), and higher mismatch responses are associated with lower decision confidence. Connectivity analyses
revealed expectancy information to be represented in bilateral orbitofrontal cortex and sensory signals to be represented in
intracalcarine sulcus. Together, our results indicate that predictive information is integrated into subjective confidence in rIFG,
and reveal an occipital-frontal network that constructs confidence from top-down and bottom-up signals. This interpretation was
further supported by exploratory findings that the white matter density of right orbitofrontal cortex negatively predicted its
respective contribution to the construction of confidence. Our findings advance our understanding of the neural basis of subjective
perceptual processes by revealing an occipitofrontal functional network that integrates prior beliefs into the construction of
confidence.
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Introduction
Perception is increasingly being seen as an active process, in
which current or future sensory states are inferred from predic-
tive information (Engel et al., 2001; Lee, 2002; Bar, 2007; Beck
and Kastner, 2009; Fiser et al., 2010; Gilbert and Li, 2013). These
predictions can be modeled in Bayesian terms as prior beliefs,
which bias perceptual inference toward solutions that are a priori
more likely in a given context (Bu¨lthoff et al., 1998; Serie`s and
Seitz, 2013; Trapp and Bar, 2015). Predictions, or priors, can have
striking effects on perception, especially under high sensory un-
certainty. For example, ambiguous rotational motion can be sub-
jectively disambiguated by prior exposure to rotation direction,
resulting in the perception of a rotation direction despite none
existing in the physical stimulus (Maloney et al., 2005). In labo-
ratory conditions, these behavioral effects of prediction are typi-
cally accompanied by increases in BOLD amplitude, ERP
amplitude and evoked gamma power, both over sensory (Egner
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Significance Statement
Perceptual decision-making is typically conceived as an integration of bottom-up and top-down influences. However,
perceptual decisions are accompanied by a sense of confidence. Confidence is an important facet of perceptual conscious-
ness yet remains poorly understood. Here we implicate right inferior frontal gyrus in constructing confidence from the
discrepancy between perceptual judgment and its prior probability. Furthermore, we place right inferior frontal gyrus
within an occipitofrontal network, consisting of orbitofrontal cortex and intracalcarine sulcus, which represents and
communicates relevant top-down and bottom-up signals. Together, our data reveal a role of frontal regions in the top-down
processes enabling perceptual decisions to become available for conscious report.
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et al., 2010; Wacongne et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2013; Bauer et al.,
2014; Kouider et al., 2015) and decision-related (Bubic et al.,
2009) brain regions. These neural responses are typically re-
ferred to as a “prediction error” response profile and taken to
represent the discrepancy between internal templates and per-
ceptual content.
The perceptual content that forms the basis of our visual ex-
perience is accompanied by a degree of subjective confidence.
Confidence reflects the estimated accuracy of a perceptual choice
and can be seen as a gate for postperceptual processes, such as
learning and belief-updating (Nassar et al., 2010; Yeung and
Summerfield, 2012). However, while subjective confidence is an
integral part of perceptual experience that is easy to probe in
human subjects (Seth et al., 2008; Sandberg et al., 2010; Over-
gaard and Sandberg, 2012; Fleming and Lau, 2014; Wierzchon´ et
al., 2014), its construction remains poorly understood.
It is clear that confidence increases with evidence in support of
the decision (Fetsch et al., 2014b; Gherman and Philiastides,
2015; Hebart et al., 2016). Decision and subjective confidence are
thought to evolve together until the first-order, objective decision
has been made (Ratcliff and Starns, 2009; Kepecs and Mainen,
2012). Accordingly, there exists strong evidence for a common
sensory signal underlying both types of report (Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009; Fetsch et al., 2014a; Kiani et al., 2014). However,
influences on objective decisions are not always reflected in sub-
jective aspects of decision-making. For example, evidence for the
unchosen perceptual inference is underweighted in confidence
judgments (Zylberberg et al., 2012; Maniscalco et al., 2016).
Although many studies have investigated the role of top-down
prior expectations on objective decision-making, surprisingly lit-
tle research has investigated the role of such priors on confidence.
Converging behavioral evidence indicates that subjective confi-
dence increases with prior evidence in favor of the associated
choice (Meyniel et al., 2015a; Sherman et al., 2015). This suggests
that the construction of confidence may involve a comparison
process between decision and prior, yet the neural substrates ac-
companying this comparison remain unexplored.
Here we aimed to identify brain regions in which prior per-
ceptual expectations are integrated into confidence judgments.
Based on aforementioned previous work, we reasoned that con-
fidence should be high when decisions are supported by prior
knowledge (i.e., when the discrepancy between expectation and
perceptual decision is low). We therefore sought to identify brain
regions that: (1) are sensitive to both “prediction error” and con-
fidence, and (2) in which prediction error and confidence are
negatively correlated. In such a region, confidence would be as-
sociated with the mismatch between internal templates and
perceptual contents.
We further hypothesized that regions found to integrate prior
expectations into confidence judgments should be functionally
connected with two information sources: one representing the
decision evidence or sensory information and one that represents
the prior expectation. As confidence increasingly depends on
prior expectations, functional connectivity (FC) with the source
of the priors should increase. Similarly, when confidence is less
dependent on priors, FC with sensory regions should increase.
Materials and Methods
Participants. The study was approved by the Brighton and Sussex Medical
School Research Governance and Ethics Committee. Twenty-four
healthy, English-speaking and right-handed subjects were tested (age
19 –34 years, mean 25 years; 13 females). Data from 5 participants were
excluded: 2 for whom thresholding failed (Gabor hit rate  2%, visual
search d  0.1); one who revealed abnormal vision only after scanning
(whose estimated contrast thresholds were accordingly 2 SD from the
mean); one for excessive head movement in the scanner, such that their
T1 scan was unusable; and one for failing to respond on 33% of trials
(relative to a mean of 3%). This left 19 participants with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision for analysis. All participants gave informed,
written consent and were reimbursed £50 for their time.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted over three sessions, at least
2 h apart (no participant completed all three on a single day). In Session
1, informed consent was obtained. Participants were trained on all tasks
before scanning. This consisted of on-screen instructions, followed by a
minimum of 10 practice trials of each task. Participants were encouraged
to continue training until the task was well understood and response
mappings learned. Next, three separate staircase procedures were run to
equate detection accuracy across levels of attention and across partici-
pants. These were completed in the scanner without acquiring EPIs.
Finally, two 17 min runs of experimental trials were completed while EPI
scans were acquired.
Session 2 did not include a training component but was otherwise
identical to Session 1. Session 3 consisted of 10 min for T1 acquisition, 15
min of retinotopy (data from which are not used in this paper), and, time
permitting, one more experimental run (8 participants completed this).
Two participants were only able to complete three runs in total, and two
participants completed a total of six runs. This variation in number of
runs was a result of scanner availability.
Once the three sessions had been completed participants were com-
pensated for their time and debriefed.
Experimental design. The paradigm used in the present study was
adapted from a previously reported design (Sherman et al., 2015). The
visual display was identical in all sections of the sessions (training, stair-
case, and experimental). It consisted of a central visual search array and
the presence or absence of a to-be-detected Gabor patch in the periphery
(Fig. 1; Trial sequence).
In experimental trials, the principal task was Gabor detection. Two
factors were orthogonally manipulated: prior probability of Gabor pres-
ence and attention. Expectations were manipulated blockwise by manip-
ulating the percentage of trials on which a Gabor was present within the
block and informing participants of this probability: a 25% condition
induced an expectation of Gabor absence; a 75% condition induced an
expectation of Gabor presence; and a 50% condition acted as a control
(flat prior). Attention was manipulated by instructing participants to
either perform or ignore a visual search task, presented concurrently with
the Gabor target. This task consisted of detecting target ‘T’s among an
array of distracter ‘L’s. Performing both tasks concurrently diverted at-
tention from the Gabor detection task, allowing us to separate effects of
expectation from those of attention.
There were 12 trials in each condition and each condition occurred
once per scanning run, in fully counterbalanced order. Participants were
informed of both the expectation and attention condition before each
experimental block began via the presentation of an instruction screen
presented for 10 s (Fig. 1). Participants were instructed to always main-
tain fixation at a central cross.
Trial sequence. The trial sequence was identical for training, staircas-
ing, and experimental trials and is shown in Figure 1. These sections
differed only in task instructions and response prompts (see Experimen-
tal design). Trials began with a white fixation cross of random duration
between 2.5 and 5 s. Next, a visual search array appeared, which consisted
of seven letters (1.6°  2.4°): all white, capital ‘L’s (50% chance), or a
white, capital ‘T’ replacing an ‘L’ (50% chance). All letters were equidis-
tant from fixation (eccentricity 4.3°) and took an independently random
orientation. These were subsequently masked by a matching array of ‘F’s
to increase task difficulty. In total, the visual search array was present for
1.1 s. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between target and masking
arrays was titrated for each participant to achieve 79% accuracy (see
Staircases).
On some trials, a near-threshold (4% contrast under full atten-
tion and 6% under diverted attention) peripheral (eccentricity 8°)
Gabor patch (orientation  135°, phase 45° on 50% of trials, 225° on
50% of trials, sf  3c/°, Gaussian SD  0.45°) was also presented. On
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these trials, the Gabor target appeared simultaneously with visual
search array onset. To minimize attentional capture, the Gabor was
presented over 0.6 s in a Gaussian envelope over time so that it had a
gradual onset and offset. Stimulus contrast was titrated to equate
performance across levels of attention and participants at 79% accu-
racy (see Staircases).
The interval between offset of the masking array and onset of re-
sponse prompts was jittered during experimental trials. The aim here
was to minimize motor cortex activity reflecting response
anticipation. Jitter was randomly selected from the discrete values
1.3 s:0.3 s:3.1 s.
Response prompts were presented at the end of the trial. The first
prompt asked whether the Gabor had been presented. “Absent”/
“Present” responses were recorded by pressing the outer left/right
key. This prompt was presented on all trials, except those of the visual
search staircase procedure (only visual search performed). The sec-
ond prompt asked whether participants guessed (inner left) or were
confident (inner right) in their Gabor detection response (not pre-
sented during staircases). The third prompt was only presented on
trials where participants performed the visual search task. This asked
whether the visual search target ‘T’ was absent (outer left) or present
(outer right). Response prompts remained onscreen for 2 s, and re-
sponses were coded as missed trials if no response was given within
the allowed time.
Staircases. Before each experimental session, three separate adaptive
1-up-3-down psychophysical staircase procedures (nine reversals) were
completed in the scanner. The aim of these staircases was (1) to equate
Gabor detection and visual search performance across subjects and (2) to
equate Gabor detection performance across levels of attention. We did
not equate Gabor detection performance across levels of expectation
because expectation does not tend to affect detection sensitivity (Kok et
al., 2012a; Morales et al., 2015; Sherman et al., 2015).
Staircase trials were identical to those in experimental trials (see Trial
structure), except: there was no manipulation of attention or expecta-
tion; the Gabor was always present, but randomly oriented either 45° to
the left or to the right; the Gabor task was left/right orientation discrim-
ination instead of yes/no target detection; and confidence ratings were
not requested.
We used orientation discrimination instead of Gabor detection so that
the Gabor would be present on every trial, enabling effective titration.
Although this procedure might not lead to precisely 79% correct on the
Gabor detection task, performance on this task should still be equated
across levels of attention and across subjects, which was the main goal of
the staircasing procedure.
Staircase 1 titrated Gabor contrast to achieve 79% accuracy under full
attention. Initial contrast was 1.5%. The visual search array was masked
after 0.5 s. Participants were instructed to ignore the visual search array
but still fixate centrally.
Staircase 2 titrated the SOA between the visual search array and mask-
ing array to set performance at 79% (in the visual search task). Initial
SOA was 500 ms. Participants ignored the Gabor orientation task and
only performed the visual search task. The (ignored) Gabor was pre-
sented at the contrast acquired in Staircase 1.
Staircase 3 titrated Gabor contrast to achieve 79% accuracy in Gabor
orientation discrimination under diverted attention (i.e., under dual-
task conditions). Initial contrast was set at that obtained in Staircase 1
(under single-task conditions) and visual search SOA was set at the value
obtained by Staircase 2. Here, participants performed both the Gabor
and the visual search tasks. The visual search SOA was set at the value
obtained in the previous staircase and initial contrast was set at that
obtained in the first. Gabor contrast was titrated over the course of the
staircase to obtain contrast thresholds under diverted attention.
Statistical analyses. Gabor detection sensitivity and decision threshold
were quantified by computing signal detection theoretic measures d and
c, respectively. These are computed by classifying trials as hits (h), misses
(m), false alarms (fa), or correct rejections (cr). Hit rate (HR) and false
alarm rate (FAR) are defined as follows:
HR 
h
h  m
and FAR 
fa
fa  cr
Where Z is the inverse cdf of the standard normal distribution, detection
sensitivity d, and decision threshold c are defined as follows:
d  ZHR	  ZFAR	 and c  
ZHR	  ZFAR	
2
Confidence was computed by calculating the proportion of trials on
which each subject reported “confident.” We did not use the Type 2
signal detection theory measure of confidence threshold Type 2 C
because it is an unprincipled measure (Galvin et al., 2003).
Behavioral and follow-up statistical tests were run on JASP (Love et al.,
2015). When the null hypothesis was predicted, Bayesian t tests and
repeated-measures ANOVAs used the JASP default Cauchy prior of
+
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Gabor present, visual search target absent
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1.1-SOA
+
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Figure 1. Trial sequence. Blocks began with instructions signaling the expectation and attention condition. In this example, the participant should expect target absence and ignore the
concurrent visual search task (i.e., allocate full attention to Gabor detection). On each trial, a visual search target T was either absent (top) or present (bottom) with 50% probability. On each trial,
a target Gabor was either present (top) or absent (bottom). The probability of Gabor presentation changes with experimental condition. Response cues followed the offset of the stimuli. Staircase
trials were identical, except that there was no condition-specific instruction at the beginning and confidence reports were not requested.
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Y  0.7, centered on zero. All results presented were robust to reasonable
adjustments of this value. Bayes factors 1/3/10/100 are, respectively,
interpreted as showing insensitive/moderate/strong/very strong evi-
dence for the alternative hypothesis (Kass and Raftery, 1995). Bayes fac-
tors less than the reciprocal of these values are given the same labels but
refer to the null hypothesis.
Unless otherwise stated, all repeated-measures ANOVA results met
the assumption of sphericity. When sphericity was violated, corrected
degrees of freedom and p values were used. The Greenhouse-Geisser
correction was used for small violations ( 
 0.75) and the Huynh-Feldt
correction for large violations (  0.75).
MRI acquisition and preprocessing. Functional T2*-sensitive EPIs were
acquired on a Siemens Avanto 1.5T scanner. Axial slices were tilted to
minimize signal dropout from frontal and occipital cortices. 34 2 mm
slices with 1 mm gaps were acquired (TR  2863 ms, TE  50 ms, FOV 
192 mm  192 mm, matrix  64  64, flip angle  90°). Full brain
T1-weighted structural scans were acquired on the same scanner and
were composed of 176 1-mm-thick sagittal slices (TR  2730 ms, TE 
3.57 ms, FOV  224 mm  256 mm, matrix  224  256, Flip
angle  7°) using the MPRAGE protocol.
Each functional run lasted 17 min. The first four functional volumes of
each run were treated as dummy scans and discarded. Images were pro-
cessed using SPM8 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/
spm8/). Images were preprocessed using standard procedures: anatom-
ical and functional images were reoriented to the anterior commissure;
images were slice-time corrected with the middle slice used as the refer-
ence; and EPIs were aligned to each other and coregistered to the struc-
tural scan by minimizing normalized mutual information. Next, EPIs
were spatially normalized to MNI space using parameters obtained from
the segmentation of T1 images into gray matter (GM) and white
matter (WM). Finally, spatially normalized images were smoothed
with a Gaussian smoothing kernel of 8 mm FWHM.
fMRI statistical analysis. At the participant level, BOLD responses were
time-locked to the onset of the visual search array (which appeared at the
same time as the Gabor, if present), enabling us to examine BOLD re-
sponses to both target present and target absent trials. BOLD responses
were modeled in a GLM with regressors and their corresponding tempo-
ral derivatives for each combination of the following factors: Attention
(full, diverted), Expectation (25%, 50%, and 75%), Stimulus (Gabor
present, Gabor absent), Report (yes, no), and Confidence (confident,
guess). If a certain combination of factors had no associated trials for a
particular participant, that regressor was removed from the participant’s
first-level model and contrast weights were rescaled.
The reliability of the regression weights was maximized by entering
data from all runs and sessions together, increasing the trial count per
regressor. To avoid smearing artifacts, no bandpass filter was applied.
Instead, low-frequency drifts were regressed out by entering WM drift
(averaged over the brain) as a nuisance regressor (Law et al., 2005).
Nuisance regressors representing the experimental run and six head mo-
tion parameters were also included in the first-level models.
Comparisons of interest were tested by running one-sample t tests
against zero at the participant level, then running group-level paired t
tests on those one-sample contrast images. Unless otherwise stated, all
contrasts at the group level were run with peak thresholds of p 
 0.001
(uncorrected) and corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level
using the FDR method.
We wanted to control for possible confounds between reaction speed
and confidence (Petrusic and Baranski, 2003) which correlate (see e.g.,
Grinband, Hirsch, and Ferrera, 2006), and between individual or
condition-wise differences in Gabor contrast and confidence (which cor-
relate) (Rahnev et al., 2011). To do this, a control GLM was computed.
Here, each regressor was parametrically modulated by both Gabor con-
trast (linear modulation) and reaction time (quadratic modulation). By
design, this model controlled for (1) reaction time-confidence associa-
tions and (2) across-subject and across-condition differences in Gabor
contrast. The Results section reports analyses on our main model (the
model without parametric modulators) because the control model had a
fourfold increase in number of regressors, reducing statistical power.
Nonetheless, all GLM analyses were replicated under our control model
when using a peak threshold of p 
 0.005. Crucially, all results under
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) were also replicated when using a peak
threshold of p 
 0.001.
Functional ROIs were extracted using the MarsBaR 0.42 toolbox
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/download.html). Anatomical areas
were labeled using the SPM Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Brodmann areas were identified using MRIcro (Rorden and Brett, 2000).
Results of whole-brain analyses were plotted onto glass brains using
MATcro (now called MRIcroS, https://www.nitrc.org/plugins/mwiki/
index.php/mricros:MainPage). Other figures were made using the Can-
lab Coretools toolbox (https://github.com/canlab/CanlabCore) and cus-
tom code.
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis. The PPI analysis was
performed using the CONN FC toolbox (http://web.mit.edu/swg/
software.htm). The GLM comprised regressors for attention condition
(full/diverted), confidence (confident/guess), and expectation-response
congruence (congruent/neutral/incongruent). Nuisance regressors were
identical to those used in the GLM on BOLD, with the addition of scrub-
bing parameters, which exclude outlier volumes that bias connectivity
estimates. Again, the signal was not bandpass filtered, but instead the
mean WM drift was entered as a nuisance regressor. Otherwise, default
prepreprocessing steps were taken: the data were denoised by regressing
out signal from WM, from CSF and from each individual condition, plus
signal associated with all nuisance regressors. The PPI was run on uni-
variate regression weights to identify effective connectivity between a
functionally defined seed (rIFG) and remaining voxels. These weights
were examined in a second-level model, which used an uncorrected peak
threshold of p 
 0.005 and FDR cluster corrected threshold of p 
 0.05.
Voxel-based morphometry. T1-weighted structural scans were reori-
ented to the anterior commissure and segmented into GM, WM, and
CSF. These were normalized to MNI space using DARTEL with SPM
defaults and a Gaussian smoothing kernel of 8 mm FWHM (Ashburner
and Friston, 2000). Modulated WM and GM images were separately
compared across participants in a multiple regression with age and
total intracranial volume (GM  WM  CSF) as nuisance regressors.
Gender was not included because this resulted in multicollinearity
between regressors (older participants were more likely to be male).
Clusters reported as significantly correlating with behavior survived
voxelwise FWE correction.
Results
Expectations liberalize decision thresholds and attention
increases contrast sensitivity
Our first analyses confirmed the efficacy of our paradigm. To
equate difficulty across attention conditions and participants,
adaptive psychophysical staircases identified the stimulus con-
trast required for 79% accuracy on the Gabor detection task (see
Staircases). Comparing the acquired contrasts in the full (4.34 
3.50%, mean  SD) and diverted (5.69  3.79%) attention con-
ditions revealed that contrast thresholds were significantly lower
under full than diverted attention (t(19)  2.95, p  0.014, 95% CI
[0.50%, 2.31%], dz  0.70), indicating that our paradigm suc-
cessfully manipulated attention.
To ensure that our staircase procedure successfully equated
detection sensitivity d across conditions, we ran a within-
subjects Attention (full, diverted)  Expectation (25%, 50%,
75%) ANOVA. This revealed no significant difference between d
under full (1.06  0.14) and diverted (1.21  0.20) attention
conditions (F(1,18)  0.34, p  0.569, p
2
 0.02) (Fig. 2A), and
was corroborated by a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA of
the same design that revealed moderate evidence for the null
hypothesis (BF  0.240). There was no significant effect of Ex-
pectation on d (F(2,36)  0.70, p  0.505, p
2  0.04, BF  0.07;
strong evidence for the null) and no significant interaction term
(F(2,36)  0.76, p  0.476, p
2  0.04, BF  0.016; strong evidence
for the null). Our staircases therefore successfully equated d.
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To determine whether we had successfully manipulated pri-
ors, we compared signal detection theoretic decision thresholds
(c, see Materials and Methods) across levels of expectation (de
Lange et al., 2013; Morales et al., 2015; Sherman et al., 2015). As
the expectation of Gabor presence over absence increases, deci-
sion threshold should become increasingly biased toward “yes”
responses (i.e., liberalized, indicated by lower values of c). This
was confirmed in a within-subjects Attention (full, diverted) 
Expectation (25%, 50%, 75%) ANOVA (F(1.65,29.72)  18.10, p 

0.001, p
2  0.50). LSD post hoc tests revealed a greater bias toward
reporting “yes” in the 50% (neutral) than the 25% (expect ab-
sent) condition (p  0.010, dz  1.15), and in the 75% (expect
present) than the 50% (neutral) condition (p 
 0.001, dz  1.39)
(Fig. 2B). We found no evidence for attentional effects on deci-
sion threshold (F(1,18)  3.38, p  0.083, p
2  0.16) and no
Expectation  Attention interaction (F(2,36)  0.37, p  0.693,
p
2  0.020).
Summarizing these results, our design successfully indepen-
dently manipulated attention and expectation, while keeping de-
tection sensitivity constant across conditions.
Expectations increase confidence
We have previously shown that subjective confidence increases
when perceptual decisions are congruent with prior expectations
(Sherman et al., 2015), and on this basis, hypothesized that con-
fidence would relate to prediction error signals. To determine
whether we had replicated this behavioral result, we compared
confidence for expectation-congruent and expectation-inc-
ongruent perceptual decisions. Congruent responses are “yes”
reports in the 75% (expect present) condition and “no” reports in
the 25% (expect absent) condition. The reverse applies for in-
congruent responses. An effect of congruence is therefore dem-
onstrated by an interaction between expectation and report,
whereby when participants report “yes,” confidence increases
with increasing prior probability of target presence, and when
participants report “no” confidence increases with decreasing
probability of target presence.
The percentage of high confidence trials were subjected to an
Attention (full, diverted)  Accuracy (correct, incorrect)  Ex-
pectation (25%, 50%, 75%)  Report (yes, no) repeated-
measures ANOVA. Participants appropriately showed higher
confidence in correct than in incorrect detection judgments
(F(1,18)  54.583, p 
 0.001, 
2  0.752). Confidence was subject
to several other effects. Overall, confidence was higher when re-
porting absence. This held for incorrect but not correct judg-
ments, and under full but not diverted attention. Attention also
interacted with expectation such that under attention confidence
was higher when the prior was informative (the 25% and 75%
conditions), but under diverted attention confidence was higher
in the absence of an informative prior (50% condition). Statistics
are presented in Table 1.
Crucially, congruent reports were associated with higher con-
fidence than incongruent reports, as shown by a significant Ex-
pectation  Report interaction (F(2,36)  15.535, p 
 0.001, 
2 
0.463) (Fig. 3). Here, confidence for “yes” responses was higher in
the 75% (congruent) than the 25% (incongruent) condition
(t(18)  2.51, p  0.021), whereas confidence for “no” responses
was higher in the 25% (congruent) than the 75% (incongruent)
condition (t(18)  3.83, p  0.001). The three-way interaction
with Attention was not significant (p  0.938). Confidence
therefore increased when the reported percept was congruent
with prior expectations, independently of attentional resource. In
other words, perceptual decisions that were consistent with prior
beliefs were associated with higher confidence. This crucial be-
havioral result motivated our investigation into the neural corre-
lates of predictability effects on subjective confidence.
Two forms of congruency
To unravel the neural correlates of predictive influences on con-
fidence, we first needed to identify brain regions sensitive to per-
ceptual expectations. We predicted, based on previous work, that
areas sensitive to perceptual expectations would exhibit an in-
creased BOLD amplitude for trials on which expectations were
violated (Egner et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2012a; Jiang et al., 2013;
Kouider et al., 2015; St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015).
The experimental design used near-threshold stimuli, leading
to potential dissociations between stimulus presentation and per-
ceptual contents. Accordingly, expectations can be violated in
two ways. First, stimulus presentation can be unexpected. These
violations are under the control of the experimenter. We refer to
the neural correlate of this expectancy violation PESTIMULUS. Sec-
ond, the perceptual report (i.e., perceptual content) can be in-
congruent with that expected. These violations are not under the
control of the experimenter. Rather, they are a function of the
participant’s sensory representation. We refer to the neural cor-
relate of this expectancy violation PEREPORT. PESTIMULUS is most
often observed at lower levels of the perceptual hierarchy (Kok et
al., 2012a; Chennu et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2013), whereas the
decision-related PEREPORT signals have been reported in both
visual cortex (Pajani et al., 2015) and higher-level, decision-
related areas (Bubic et al., 2009).
Figure 2. Behavioral effects of expectation and attention on objective and subjective
decision-making. A, Detection sensitivity d as a function of expectation and attention condi-
tion. No significant differences were found. B, Decision threshold c as a function of expectation
and attention condition. Independently of attention, bias toward reporting “yes” (lower values
of c) increased with the prior probability of Gabor presence. Error bars indicate within-subjects
within-subject SEM.
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Representation of PESTIMULUS in
visual cortex
In our first analysis, we searched for re-
gions that are sensitive to discrepancies
between expectation and stimulus presen-
tation over whole brain. To do this, we
computed the contrast unexpected stimu-
lus presentation  expected stimulus pre-
sentation. Gabor presence is expected in
the 75% condition but unexpected in the
25% condition, whereas Gabor absence is
expected in the 25% condition but unex-
pected in the 75% condition. Our analysis
identified one PESTIMULUS-sensitive area
in contralateral occipital cortex (V1-V3,
BA18, peak MNI x  12, y  80, z 
22, Zpeak  4.09, 0.66 cm
3, cluster pFDR 
0.350, puncorr  0.023) and one on the
ipsilateral side (V1-V3, BA18, peak
MNI x  8, y  80, z  18, Zpeak  3.99,
1.01 cm 3, cluster pFDR  0.205,
puncorr  0.007). Neither of these clusters
survived cluster-level correction, so they
will not be considered beyond this point.
They are presented simply to show
consistency with previous studies, in
which statistical power was improved by
constraining the analysis with functional
localizers (Smith and Muckli, 2010; Kok
et al., 2012a, b; Larsson and Smith, 2012;
Jiang et al., 2013).
The whole-brain contrast PESTIMULUS, attended 
PESTIMULUS, unattended yielded no significant or marginally
significant clusters, indicating no evidence for a PESTIMULUS 
attention interaction.
Using a peak threshold of p 
 0.005, both of these analyses
were replicated under our control model, which included reac-
tion speed and Gabor contrast as parametric modulators (unex-
pected  expected, contralateral: pFDR  0.446, puncorr  0.014,
ipsilateral: pFDR  0.446, puncorr  0.011).
Regions representing PEREPORT
Next, we searched for regions whose BOLD response reflects
the discrepancy between expectation and perceptual report.
Expectation-congruent reports are “yes” responses in
the 75% (expect present) condition and “no” responses in the
25% (expect absent) condition. The reverse applies for
expectation-incongruent reports. These definitions differ
from those in the previous analysis because they consider per-
ceptual report instead of stimulus presence or absence. In
turn, this analysis searches for regions sensitive to unexpected
perceptual content.
The contrast expectation-incongruent report  expectation-
congruent report was computed over whole brain. This revealed
eight significant clusters distributed throughout the cortex (Fig.
4A; Table 2). We found no significant clusters for the reverse
contrast, even with a more liberal peak threshold of p 
 0.005
uncorrected.
Regions exhibiting a PEREPORT pattern should show a larger
BOLD response to incongruent than congruent responses, re-
gardless of whether the response was “yes” or “no” (Kok et al.,
2012a). We checked whether this held in these putative
PEREPORT regions by extracting median regression coefficients
as a function of attention, expectation and report, and subject-
ing them to separate repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Results are depicted in Figure 4B, and statistics are
presented in Table 3. All regions exhibited a significant
PEREPORT response for both “yes” and “no” judgments, except
middle orbital gyrus and left inferior frontal gyrus. Accord-
ingly, these clusters were excluded from our set of PEREPORT
regions.
Under our control model (in which regressors were para-
metrically modulated by Gabor contrast and reaction speed,
see Materials and Methods), all significant results here were
Table 1. Significant results from four-way repeated-measures ANOVA on behavioral confidence
ANOVA
Follow-up contrast
Post-hoc t test
F p 2 t p Mdiff (%) SEdiff (%)
Response 9.32 0.007 0.341 No-yes 12.71 4.15
Response  accuracy 71.34 
0.001 0.799
No-yes (correct) 0.83 0.416 4.40 5.28
No-yes (incorrect) 7.85 
0.001 30.93 3.94
Response  attention 15.41 0.001 0.461
No-yes (full) 5.26 
0.001 22.20 4.22
No-yes (diverted) 0.52 0.607 2.87 5.49
Expectation  attention 8.65 0.001 0.325
Quadratic trend 25%  75%  50% (full) 3.19 0.005 5.12 1.60
Quadratic trend 50%  25%  75% (diverted) 2.27 0.036 5.86 2.58
Figure 3. Confidence as a function of attention, accuracy, report, and expectation. Each panel represents confidence as
a function of expectation and yes/no report. Panels in the left column represent confidence for correct responses. Panels in
the right column represent confidence for incorrect responses. Panels in the top row represent confidence under full
attention. Panels in the bottom row represent confidence under divided attention. Independently of accuracy (column) and
attention (row), confidence increases with expectation-response congruence. Within each panel, confidence for “yes”
responses increases with increasing prior probability of presence (i.e., increasing congruence), and for “no” responses it
decreases with increasing prior probability of presence (i.e., decreasing congruence). Error bars indicate within-subjects
SEM.
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replicated, at least at marginal significance (rIFG, our critical
region, pFDR  0.044). Results were fully replicated when us-
ing a peak threshold of p 
 0.005. This means that PEREPORT
responses do not reflect reaction speed or Gabor contrast/
detection sensitivity.
In summary, we have identified six regions signaling
PEREPORT as follows: right middle temporal gyrus, right superior
medial gyrus, rIFG, right angular gyrus, and bilateral inferior
parietal lobule. These regions are sensitive to the discrepancy
between perceptual expectations and perceptual choice (i.e., to
unexpected perceptual inferences).
High confidence is associated with an
attenuated PEREPORT response in rIFG
Our key hypothesis was that high confi-
dence would be associated with low
PEREPORT. However, confidence can be
also influenced by attention (Rahnev et
al., 2011) and tracks accuracy (Dienes,
2008; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010). To
test whether any PEREPORT region repre-
sented confidence after controlling for
these potential confounds, median regres-
sion weights from each PEREPORT region
were extracted as a function of confi-
dence, attention, and decision accuracy.
These regression coefficients were then
subjected to separate Bayesian repeated-
measures ANOVAs. We were looking for
regions whose BOLD response (in these
regions, representing PEREPORT) differs
with confidence. We could not test for
a PEREPORT  Confidence interaction:
when the participant reports low confi-
dence, they have signaled their yes/no
decision as unreliable; that is, their per-
ception of Gabor presence or absence
does not necessarily correspond to their
report. Because PEREPORT is a function of
both Expectation and Report, this variable
will also be unreliable when the partici-
pant has reported low confidence.
Only one region exhibited a BOLD re-
sponse (i.e., PEREPORT amplitude) that
differed as a function of subjective confi-
dence: rIFG. Here, supporting our hy-
pothesis, BOLD amplitude was higher for
guess than confident reports (Fig. 5A).
Crucially, the analysis revealed substan-
tially more evidence for modeling rIFG
BOLD as a function of confidence alone (BF  13.620) than as a
function of just accuracy (BF  0.877), just attention (BF 
0.711), or as a combination of confidence and any other factors
(BF  0.003–2.069; for summary of results from all ROIs, see
Table 4). A frequentist ANOVA gave the same result: a signifi-
cantly higher BOLD amplitude for guess than confident re-
sponses (F(1,18)  6.04, p  0.024, 
2  0.251, 95% CI [0.10,
1.28]). These results are shown in Figure 5B.
Does rIFG sensitivity to confidence indeed reflect an effect of
expectation? If so, the effect of expectation on confidence (as
shown in Fig. 3) should be correlated with IFG PEREPORT ampli-
tude. We tested this with an across-subject brain-behavior corre-
lation. Our behavioral variable was the effect of expectations on
confidence, denoted Confidence  Confidencecongruent 
Confidenceincongruent. Because PEREPORT cannot be meaningfully
computed for guess responses (see above), it was computed
from confident responses only.
Correlating these two variables revealed a significant neg-
ative correlation (  0.512, p  0.027) (Fig. 5C): smaller
PEREPORT amplitude in rIFG was associated with larger in-
creases in confidence for expectation-congruent perceptual
decisions. In turn, this result confirms our finding that high
confidence is associated with low PEREPORT in rIFG, and im-
plicates rIFG in the mechanism by which prior expectations
increase confidence.
 
1.5
In
co
ng
ru
en
t -
 c
on
gr
ue
nt
 
 
β
 
 
 Reported ‘no’
B
In
fe
ri
o
r 
fr
o
n
ta
l
 g
yr
u
s 
(L
)
IP
L 
(L
)
Su
p
er
io
r 
 m
ed
ia
l
g
yr
u
s 
(R
)
M
id
d
le
 o
rb
it
al
g
yr
u
s 
(R
)
In
fe
ri
o
r 
fr
o
n
ta
l
g
yr
u
s 
(R
)
A
n
g
u
la
r 
g
yr
u
s 
(R
)
IP
L 
(R
)
M
id
d
le
 t
em
p
o
ra
l
g
yr
u
s 
(R
)
Inferior frontal gyrus
IPL
Left side Right side
Inferior frontal gyrus
MTG Middle orbital gyrus
Superior medial gyrus
Angular gyrus
A
 Reported ‘yes’
**
*
n.s
.
2
1
0.5
0
**
*
***
*
*
*
*
*
*
n.s
.
**
**
*
IPL
Figure 4. Report prediction error. A, Results of contrast incongruent response  congruent response over whole brain. Only
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0.05, PEREPORT significantly different from zero. **p 
 0.01, PEREPORT significantly different from zero. ***p 
 0.001, PEREPORT
significantly different from zero. Error bars indicate SEM.
Table 2. Results of whole-brain analysis expectation-incongruent report >
expectation-congruent reporta
Region BA Side
Volume
(cm 3) Peak Z pFDR
Peak MNI
x y z
MTG 21 R 2.29 4.78 0.007 54 30 2
SMG 9/10 R 4.15 4.54 
0.001 12 58 32
IFG 47/48 R 2.70 4.45 0.004 56 12 2
MOG 47/46 R 2.08 4.33 0.009 40 50 6
AG 39 R 1.21 3.95 0.044 46 64 36
IPL 40 R 1.21 3.91 0.044 58 40 40
IFG 47 L 1.90 3.79 0.012 38 26 4
IPL 40/48 L 1.60 3.75 0.021 54 46 34
aMTG, Middle temporal gyrus; SMG, superior medial gyrus; MOG, middle orbital gyrus; AG, angular gyrus; IPL,
inferior parietal lobule.
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To ensure that these differences were not driven by differ-
ences in reaction speed or Gabor contrast, we extracted data
from the rIFG cluster revealed by our control GLM. This re-
vealed that, even after controlling for these possible con-
founds, rIFG BOLD was significantly higher for guess than
confident responses (t(18)  2.21, p  0.041, dz  0.44). The
significant brain-behavior correlation was also replicated
(  0.510, p  0.027).
Together, these analyses reveal that subjective confidence is
reliably associated with PEREPORT in right IFG even after control-
ling for attention, Gabor contrast, decision accuracy, and reac-
tion speed.
Sources of priors and sensory signals for confidence
Thus far, we have shown that lower PEREPORT amplitude in rIFG,
reflecting the extent to which perceptual inferences are unex-
pected, are associated with higher confidence. Assuming a model
in which decision confidence is a weighted function of top-down
expectations and “bottom-up” sensory signals (or decision evi-
dence), we asked whether we could identify sources of these vari-
ables. To do this, we ran a seed-to-voxel psychophysiological
interaction analysis (PPI), with rIFG as a functionally defined
seed.
We were interested in regions communicating predictive in-
formation and therefore searched for clusters exhibiting different
degrees of FC with rIFG for congruent and incongruent reports.
We reasoned that, although confidence should be a function of
both sensory signals and expectations, there would be individual
differences in how each component would be weighted, reflect-
ing, for example, how reliable the expectation information is
thought to be. Capitalizing on these individual differences, we
reasoned that rIFG would show stronger FC with the expectation
region in participants whose confidence was weighted more by
expectation. By contrast, rIFG would show stronger FC with the
source of sensory signals in participants whose confidence was
only weakly shaped by expectation.
To test this hypothesis, we used a behavioral covariate of inter-
est  the influence of expectations on confidence. This behavioral
variable was defined as Confidence  ConfidenceIncongruent 
ConfidenceCongruent, and is the same as the behavioral variable in
Figure 5C. Higher values signify that expectations exerted a stronger
effect on confidence.
Sources of predictive information for confidence were identi-
fied by computing the contrast incongruent  congruent, with
Confidence as a between-subjects covariate of interest. That is,
we searched for brain connectivity-behavior relationships.
As shown in Figure 6A, the PPI analysis revealed three signif-
icant clusters. The more expectations shaped confidence (higher
Confidence), the more that congruence was associated with FC
between rIFG and two clusters: one in left orbitofrontal cortex
(lOFC) (Confidence  congruent  incongruent; peak MNI
x  36, y  38, z  18, 3.40 cm 3, cluster pFDR  0.008) and
one in right OFC (Confidence  congruent  incongruent;
peak MNI x  10, y  26, z  18, 2.50 cm 3, cluster pFDR 
0.024).
By contrast, the less expectations shaped confidence (lower
Confidence), the more that congruence was associated with FC
between rIFG and intracalcarine sulcus (Confidence  congru-
ent  incongruent: peak MNI x  6, y  58, z  12, 3.86 cm 3,
cluster pFDR  0.004). Thus, intracalcarine sulcus and bilateral
OFCs exhibited a push-pull relationship, with the dominant re-
gion predicted by Confidence.
Although the balance of FC between these regions was deter-
mined by Confidence, FC between these rIFG and these regions
was present independently of Confidence. Specifically, FC be-
tween rIFG and OFC was greater than zero on congruent trials
(lOFC, p 
 0.001; rOFC, p  0.053), whereas intracalcarine
sulcus-rIFG FC was significantly greater than zero on incongru-
ent trials (p  0.022).
Because OFC was primarily associated with congruent re-
sponses, we reasoned that FC with these regions might reflect the
communication of perceptual priors. Consistent with this, we
found a main effect of expectation condition on lOFC BOLD
F(1.64,29.59)  3.61, p  0.047, p
2  0.167 (Fig. 5B). Here, BOLD
exhibited a ‘U’-shaped relationship with expectation (p  0.036),
consistent with the representation of prior information: BOLD
was higher when there was an informative prior (the 25% and
75% conditions) than when the prior was flat (the 50% condi-
tion). In rOFC, this pattern was exhibited under full (F(2,36) 
3.80, p  0.032, p
2  0.174) but not diverted (F(2,36)  0.87, p 
0.426, p
2  0.046) attention (interaction p  0.030, Fig. 6C).
Interestingly, in rOFC, there was also a significant attention 
confidence interaction (F(1,18)  7.84, p  0.012, p
2  0.303)
(Fig. 6D), such that attention reversed the BOLD response to
confident versus guess responses.
These results are consistent with the interpretation of bilateral
OFC communicating prior information. Whereas lOFC repre-
sented prior information independently of attention, rOFC did
this only under full attention. Moreover, the attention by confi-
dence interaction under rOFC BOLD suggests that this region
may additionally represent the degree of (reverse) uncertainty
associated with attentional state.
Next, we asked whether intracalcarine sulcus represented pre-
diction error signals. PEREPORT is demonstrated in an expectation
by report interaction, whereas PESTIMULUS is demonstrated in an
expectation by stimulus interaction. However, neither was found
(all p  0.288). Rather, the BOLD response here was marginally
higher for stimulus present than absent trials, F(1,18)  3.81, p 
0.067, p
2  0.175 (Fig. 6E).
One might wonder whether bilateral OFC directly signals pri-
ors to occipital lobe, or vice versa for sensory signals. This was not
the case. Rerunning the PPI analysis in the same way, but with
either OFC cluster as our seed, revealed no significant or margin-
ally significant connectivity with intracalcarine sulcus. Similarly,
running the analysis setting intracalcarine sulcus as the seed re-
vealed no significant or marginally significant connectivity with
either OFC cluster.
Together, these results show that the integration of expecta-
tions into confidence judgments in rIFG recruits an occipitofron-
tal network that represents top-down influences of attention and
Table 3. Effect of expectation, separately for “yes” and “no” reportsa
Region
Reported “no” Reported “yes”
PEREPORT ?F p 
2 F p 2
MTG 8.82 0.008 3.29 5.83 0.006 0.245 Yes
SMG 8.10 0.001 0.310 4.46 0.014 0.213 Yes
rIFG 4.70 0.015 0.207 3.45 0.041 0.162 Yes
MOG 1.95 0.157 0.098 3.42 0.044 0.160 No
AG 3.52 0.040 0.164 4.07 0.025 0.185 Yes
rIPL 4.71 0.044 0.207 7.17 0.015 0.285 Yes
lIFG 5.62 0.008 0.238 2.87 0.070 0.137 No
lIPL 5.39 0.032 0.230 6.04 0.005 0.251 Yes
aBoth effects should be significant for the region to be deemed a PEREPORT region. MTG, Middle temporal gyrus; SMG,
superior medial gyrus; MOG, middle orbital gyrus; AG, angular gyrus; rIPL, right inferior parietal lobule; lIFG, left
inferior frontal gyrus; lIPL, left inferior parietal lobule.
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expectation in OFC, and bottom-up sensory signals in intracal-
carine sulcus.
The contribution of OFC to confidence is predicted by
WM density
Our connectivity analyses revealed that the integration of
expectations into confidence judgments recruits OFC, represent-
ing top-down signals, and intracalcarine sulcus, representing
bottom-up signals. The extent to which each region was recruited
was predicted by individual differences in the extent to which
expectations shaped behavioral confidence. The presence of these
individual differences motivated an exploratory follow-up anal-
ysis that asked whether they are reflected in brain structure. More
specifically, we considered whether the weighting of top-down
predictions was a function of WM or GM density of the source
region.
The BOLD response of OFC reflected an effect of perceptual
expectations on objective decision. The behavioral correlate of
this is therefore c  c25%c75%, the extent to which perceptual
expectations bias (yes/no) decision. We performed a whole-brain
multiple regression analysis on WM density, with total intracra-
nial volume and participant age as nuisance covariates, and with
c as the regressor of interest. This analysis revealed that propen-
sity to incorporate low-level priors into decision-making, as
measured by c, was negatively correlated with rOFC WM den-
sity (Fig. 7; peak MNI x  23, y  30, z  14, 11.51cm 3,
ppeak-FWE  0.030, Z  5.08). The same analysis for GM yielded
no significant results.
This result suggests that the dependence of confidence on FC
with the expectation source regions is reflected in anatomical
indications of that connectivity: WM density in OFC was nega-
tively predicted by its functional correlate.
Discussion
In the present paper, we have shown that perceptual confidence
increases when decisions are supported by (or congruent with)
prior expectations. Crucially, we show that the process of inte-
grating this predictive information recruits rIFG.
Our data reveal that unexpected perceptual content is associ-
ated with heightened PEREPORT (a mismatch response to
expectation-incongruent perceptual decisions) in a distributed
set of frontal, parietal, and temporal decision-related regions.
Interestingly, this PEREPORT-sensitive set resembles those impli-
cated in other forms of “top-down” processing, such as modality-
independent sensory change detection (Downar et al., 2000),
response inhibition (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008; Criaud and
Boulinguez, 2013), and detection of behavioral salience (Downar
et al., 2002).
Crucially, the contribution of top-down expectations to sub-
jective confidence judgments was reflected in rIFG BOLD activ-
ity. Here, high confidence was associated with a lower PEREPORT
response. Furthermore, stronger behavioral effects of expectation
on confidence were associated greater PEREPORT attenuation in
this region. Control analyses ruled out explanations in terms of
attention, stimulus contrast, decision accuracy, or reaction speed.
Our results therefore indicate a central role for rIFG in subjective
perceptual decision making, in which the “mismatch” between
internal templates and perceptual content is integrated into sub-
jective confidence judgments. That is, these data indicate that
perceptual decision confidence is shaped by a neural mismatch
response that is perceptual in nature.
One might interpret PEREPORT as a arising from the prepara-
tion or execution of a response that is a priori likely to be incor-
rect. Recent evidence has shown that perceptual confidence is
increased by response-effector congruency (Fleming et al., 2015).
However, we find such an explanation for the present results
unlikely for two reasons: (1) our paradigm did not experimen-
tally induce response conflict; and (2) effects of confidence on
rIFG BOLD were independent of decision accuracy. Rather, we
suggest that PEREPORT reflects perceptual “prediction error,” aris-
ing from the degree to which the reported percept is surprising.
Our data suggest that expectations shape the decision signal on
which confidence judgments are based (although we cannot and do
not rule out an additional effect of expectations at the metacognitive
level). Accordingly, our results are consistent with many models of
choice confidence that permit expectations to shape decision evi-
dence (for a thorough review, see Summerfield and de Lange, 2014).
For example, in recent work, we have shown that the signal detection
model can be reformulated in Bayesian terms. Here, the distribu-
tions of internal responses to stimulus presence and absence are
Figure 5. The relationship between confidence and PEREPORT. A, BOLD as a function of confidence in each PEREPORT region. BOLD is significantly higher for guess than confident responses in rIFG
only. B, rIFG BOLD as a function of attention, accuracy, and confidence. BOLD is higher for guess than confidence responses independently of attention and decision accuracy. C, Brain-behavior
correlation. PEREPORT in rIFG is negatively correlated with the behavioral increase in confidence by expectation (Confidence). *p 
 0.05. Error bars indicate within-subject SEM.
Table 4. Results of Bayesian confidence  accuracy  attention
repeated-measures ANOVAsa
Bayes factorsb
Region Confidence Accuracy Attention Confidence  others Null
MTG 0.14 0.68 4.96 0.012.26 1.00
SMG 0.85 1.79 1.96 0.032.67 1.11
rIFG 13.62 0.88 0.71 
0.012.07 3.96
AG 1.35 9.83 0.53 0.013.42 3.47
rIPL 2.64 0.84 2.42 
0.011.13 10.07
lIPL 1.74 5.52 1.84 
0.011.17 10.22
aMTG, Middle temporal gyrus; SMG, superior medial gyrus; AG, angular gyrus; rIPL, right inferior parietal lobe; lIPL,
left inferior parietal lobe.
bBayes factors correspond to the evidence for the listed model relative to the evidence for all other models.
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represented as posterior probability dis-
tributions, whereas decision and confi-
dence thresholds are fixed according to
a particular posterior odds ratio (Fig.
8A) (Sherman et al., 2015). Increasing
the prior probability of target presence
will change the distribution of internal
responses, driving decision and confi-
dence thresholds. The result of this is a
greater propensity to report “yes” and to
report “confident” when target presence
expected. Crucially, these are not “un-
desirable” biases that ought be
eliminated. Rather, they reflect the un-
derlying statistics of the task, even influ-
enced by periodic fluctuations in
occipital cortex (Sherman et al., 2016).
In the present study, one could argue
that rIFG serves to compare this internal response to a confi-
dence threshold (Fig. 8B). However, such an account would
not be consistent with previous work, implicating only left IFG
in adjusting perceptual criteria, and right IFG in estimating
task difficulty and uncertainty (Tops and Boksem, 2011;
White et al., 2012; Reckless et al., 2014). However, this litera-
ture would support an account by which rIFG integrates prior
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beliefs into the internal response (Fig. 8C), forming the signal
upon which confidence is constructed.
We found that the process of relating predictive informa-
tion into confidence judgments recruited both intracalcarine
sulcus and bilateral OFCs. Intracalcarine sulcus exhibited a
marginally significant BOLD response to the stimulus, so we
interpret connectivity with this region as reflecting the com-
munication of sensory signals. We assume this effect was weak
because it was localized to a large cluster while reflecting the
neural response to a small stimulus in retinotopically orga-
nized space.
We further found that both right and left OFC represented
top-down prior information, consistent with previous work
(Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Wallis, 2007; Trapp and Bar,
2015). For left OFC, this was independent of attention, but right
OFC was sensitive to attentional state: representation of the prior
required attention. Furthermore, the effect of confidence on rOFC
BOLD reversed under diverted attention, possibly indicating that
rOFC represents the uncertainty associated with inattention.
Together, our results suggest that the construction of confi-
dence recruits intracalcarine sulcus, representing stimulus-
driven signals, OFC, representing top-down signals, and rIFG,
which maps the discrepancy between expectation and perceptual
choice to subjective confidence. OFC has been repeatedly been
shown to reflect reward expectations and beliefs (Kepecs et al.,
2008; Kim et al., 2011; De Martino et al., 2013; Lebreton et al.,
2015); however, here we place OFC belief representations within
a larger hierarchical structure for perceptual processing, perhaps
generating predictions (Stalnaker et al., 2015; Trapp and Bar,
2015) that constrain perceptual confidence.
Importantly, our PPI analysis cannot determine the directional-
ity of functional connections in this network. While the functional
data are consistent with a model in which rIFG receives top-down
and bottom-up inputs, on an alternative view bottom-up signals
may be passed to rIFG, which passes a transformation of PEREPORT
into confidence to rOFC. Under this account, rIFG would construct
the initial confidence representation, whereas OFC would transform
the confidence estimate represented in rIFG into a reportable judg-
ment, based on the mismatch between the estimate, expectations,
and potentially, attentional state (Lebreton et al., 2015). A third pos-
sibility is that rIFG is recruited for the estimation of decision uncer-
tainty, not confidence, and top-down processes from bilateral OFC
are recruited more when this uncertainty is high. Therefore, top-
down signals from rOFC would not shape rIFG representations of
confidence but rather result from uncertain (i.e., variable or noisy)
representations. Further studies will be needed sequence the involve-
ment of these regions and disambiguate these possibilities.
Our results are readily interpretable from Bayesian brain
perspectives (Lee, 2002; Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Friston, 2009;
Clark, 2013). These propose that perceptual inference is a
weighted integration of sensory evidence and prior beliefs about
the cause of the sensation, such that the perceptual report corre-
sponds to the belief with greatest posterior probability. The
posterior probability increases as the correspondence between
prior and sensory signal increases. Therefore, inference is deemed
“successful,” and so should be associated with high confidence,
when “prediction error” is low (Meyniel et al., 2015b), as we saw
here. Neuronal representations of prediction errors are well es-
tablished in the reward domain (Nakahara et al., 2004; Bayer and
Glimcher, 2005), but in the perceptual domain evidence remains
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restricted to BOLD correlates, such as PEREPORT. From Bayesian
perspectives, the finding that PEREPORT amplitude in rIFG was
lower for confident responses would point to the representation
or construction of the posterior belief in this region; and indeed,
rIFG has been found to encode the decision variable, both in
Bayesian form (the posterior) (d’Acremont et al., 2013) and as
decision evidence (Hebart et al., 2016).
Previous work has implicated rIFG in the representation of
expectation violation in a range of modalities, from speech per-
ception (Clos et al., 2014) to the auditory (Garrido et al., 2009),
visual (Bubic et al., 2009), and tactile (Allen et al., 2016) domains.
It has also been shown that rIFG represents subjective uncertainty
(Fleck et al., 2006; Fleming and Dolan, 2012). However, to our
knowledge, these functions of rIFG have not been related to each
other before. rIFG is also frequently implicated in the seemingly
disparate task of detecting or resolving response conflict (Casey et
al., 2000; Hampshire et al., 2010), and is a key component of the
response inhibition network (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008; Cri-
aud and Boulinguez, 2013). This raises the intriguing possibility
of a functional overlap between resolution of response conflict
and the formation of confidence.
These roles could be unified by considering rIFG as the region
in which the posterior belief on sensory causes is computed (at
least for perceptual tasks) because the posterior affords a hypoth-
esis space for adaptive, plausible actions (Mansouri et al., 2009).
Consistent with this view, rIFG is recruited when appropriately
acting on perceptual choices (Suzuki and Gottlieb, 2013), com-
puting behavioral significance (Sakagami and Pan, 2007), and
computing action-outcome likelihoods (Morris et al., 2014). An-
atomical considerations also support such a view because the
rIFG is directly connected with regions relevant for both cogni-
tive and motor control (Petrides and Pandya, 2002). Right IFG
may even compute high-level, abstracted posteriors that integrate
high-level beliefs about decision outcomes because the rIFG
BOLD response to erroneous decisions is associated with both
the valence of the decision outcome, and the optimism of the
participant (“self-belief”) (Sharot et al., 2011). We leave open for
future research the question of whether and how rIFG relates
perceptual confidence to action outcomes.
In conclusion, we have shown that top-down expectations are
integrated into decision confidence, and we have shown that this
occurs in a functional network consisting of rIFG, OFC, and
intracalcarine sulcus. Here, top-down perceptual expectations
and bottom-up sensory inputs are integrated into a subjective
sense of perceptual confidence. Together, our data reveal a crucial
role of top-down influences in the mechanism by which percep-
tual decisions become available for conscious report.
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